Abstract-Critical infrastructures (CIs) are large scale systems that are essential for the smooth and reliable operation of everyday activities in modern societies. To understand the operation characteristics of CIs, as well as the behavior of interdependencies between different CIs, we usually use modeling and simulation methodologies. In this work we propose an interdependent CI modeling methodology based on hybrid systems. We adopt open hybrid automata to model the constituent components of different critical infrastructures, including any dependencies that may exist between them. Then, using open hybrid automata composition properties, we can compose different CI component models together, creating a single hybrid automaton model that represents interdependent CIs. Finally, simulating the composition model we can generate sample paths that show how component faults can cascade and/or escalate between CIs.
. CI interdependencies, based on their characteristics, are usually classified into four categories [2] : (a) physical, due to physical connections between different CIs components, (b) cyber, due to information/signal transmission between different CIs, (c) geographic, due to close spatial proximity of different CIs components, and finally (d) logical, due to any other mechanism (e.g. various policy, legal, or regulatory regimes) that can link logically two or more CIs.
Although interdependencies can improve CIs efficiency and effectiveness [3] , they can also create severe problems when a fault that occurs in one critical infrastructure (e.g., due to natural disasters, terrorism, criminal activity, or malicious behavior) cascades and/or escalates through interdependencies to other infrastructures. This can disrupt multiple CIs healthy operation and create subtle feedback loops, as well as complex topologies, that can initiate and propagate disturbances in a variety of ways that are unusual and difficult to foresee [2] . For this reason modeling and simulation (M&S) methodologies are typically used to study and analyze CIs interdependencies, and to generate information regarding the consequences of failures and disruptions to multiple CIs [4] .
Several innovative M&S approaches for interdependent CIs have been already proposed. Among the most popular ones is the inoperability input-output model (IIM) , that estimates at a holistic level the inoperability of infrastructure sectors, based on perturbations that propagate among their interconnections [5] . Another popular approach is the agent-based, that considers CIs as complex adaptive systems and represents their components as agents, each with a set of rules that direct their goals [6] . Network-based approaches are also popular for representing CIs as networks, where they use nodes to denote different infrastructure components and links to denote their physical and relational connections [7] . Other approaches that have been also proposed include system reliability theory, petri nets, system dynamics approaches, and empirical approaches [8] , [1] . Unfortunately, existing approaches lack generalization and is difficult to merged together into a unified framework, and this keeps the need for exploiting new M&S approaches that can be used for studying and understanding interdependent CIs [9] , [4] .
In this paper we propose an interdependent CI modeling framework based on hybrid systems. Specifically, we adopt open hybrid automata for modeling different CIs constituent components and their dependencies. We then compose those models together, by exploiting open hybrid automata composition properties, to create a single hybrid automaton model that can represent interdependent CIs. Simulating the composition model for various scenarios, we can generate sample paths that show how component faults cascade and/or escalate and also the consequences they can have to different CIs. The proposed approach is a powerful tool for representing interdependent CIs, since it combines both discrete-event and continuous-time dynamics, with CI interdependencies to emerge naturally by modeling the dependencies between their constituent components.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; Section II discusses how hybrid systems can be used to model infrastructure components and subsequently interdependent CIs. Section III presents a modeling example that illustrates the effectiveness of the proposed approach, and Section IV presents some simulations results. Finally, Section V presents the concluding remarks and future directions. model individual CIs, such as electric power systems [11] , communication networks [12] , and transportation systems [13] . The reason that makes them so appealing is their ability to combine into a single model both continuous-time and discrete-event dynamics. Their models are called hybrid automata and they are classified into autonomous and open. The main difference between the two is that open hybrid automata enable inputs and outputs to the models that can change and/or control the continuous time and discrete event evolution of the models. This property of open hybrid automata makes them suitable for modeling components of interdependent CIs.
In more detail CIs, such as electric power systems, communication networks, water systems, etc., although heterogeneous, have similar structures and usually consist of many components connected together, ranging from parts, units, subsystems, and systems [2] . Although in the most part the state of each critical infrastructure depends on the states of all its constituent components, the various types of interdependencies between CIs can influence their states tremendously as well.
The reason that CIs interdependencies are generated is because of dependencies that exist between the constituent components of different infrastructures. Thus, by modeling how CI components are affected by their dependencies, it is possible to create models that represent interdependent CIs behavior. Open hybrid automata are great for modeling components of different CIs and their dependencies. They can describe the healthy and faulty operation of each component with continuous and discrete dynamics, and they can include distinct inputs that can trigger changes to their states because of dependencies. We make the modeling of components of different interdependent CIs possible, by proposing an open hybrid automaton formulation, based on [14] , [15] , that divides the input variables into internal inputs and dependency inputs, as follows: 
where:
• Q is a set of discrete states;
• X is a set of continuous state variables;
• V is a set of input variables, continuous or discrete, divided into two subsets V = V ∪ V with: -V denoting "internal" inputs to the model, for connections between component models of the same infrastructure; -V denoting "dependency" inputs to the model, for connections between components of different infrastructures;
• Y is a set of output variables, continuous and discrete;
• Init ⊆ Q × X is a set of initial states;
• f : Q × X × V → R n are the state equations that describe the evolution of the continuous state variables over time. They can be different in each discrete state q ∈ Q; • h : Q × X × V → Y are the output equations that can be different in each discrete state q ∈ Q;
• Inv : Q → 2 X×V assigns an invariant set that denotes the set of values that x ∈ X and v ∈ V can take in each discrete state q ∈ Q;
• E ⊆ Q × Q is a collection of edges that represent possible transitions between discrete states;
• G : E → 2 X×V assigns to each edge e = (q, q ) ∈ E a guard that denotes a condition based on x ∈ X and v ∈ V that once is true a discrete transition is enabled;
X is a reset relation to each edge e = (q, q ) ∈ E that assigns a new value in x ∈ X if necessary, before a discrete transition takes place.
The hybrid state of automaton C is referred to as (q, x) ∈ Q×X, with the number of discrete states q ∈ Q assumed to be finite, while the continuous dynamics f (q, x, v) are assumed to be globally Lipschitz continuous in x and v [15] . For more on hybrid systems theory and open hybrid automata you are encouraged to read [14] , [16] and the references therein.
A more convenient and compact way to represent hybrid automata models, rather than using the aforementioned definition, is by mixing differential equations with directed graphs as shown in Fig. 1 . Each vertex of the directed graph corresponds to a discrete state q ∈ Q and includes the continuous dynamicṡ x = f (q, x, v), the output function y = h (q, x, v) , and the invariant set Inv(q) associated with that discrete state. The edges of the directed graph represent possible discrete state transitions, and they are associated with a specific guard condition, e.g., G(q, q ), and a reset relation, e.g., R(q, q , x, v).
As a final step, all the CI components open hybrid automata models can be composed together to create a single hybrid automaton model that represents interdependent CIs. This is possible by using open hybrid automata composition properties, that enable the connection of some inputs/outputs of one hybrid automaton with some outputs/inputs of another, creating a new automaton that has the same behavior with the constituent automata (for formal definition refer to [14] ). In the case of the composition of CI component open hybrid automata models, although their inputs are divided into internal and dependency, the composition is still the same. The only difference is that the internal inputs are connected with the outputs of components that belong to the same infrastructure, representing internal infrastructure connections, and the dependency inputs are connected with the outputs of components that belong to different infrastructures representing dependencies between them.
III. MODELING EXAMPLE
To demonstrate the applicability and effectiveness of the proposed approach, we present a simple example where we use open hybrid automata to model components of power and communication infrastructures and the dependencies between them. Specifically, the CIs component models, although simple, they include physical, cyber, and logical dependencies, as well as, information on how their dependencies can influence their healthy operation. We composed all the CI models together, creating a single hybrid automaton model, that we can simulate for various scenarios and generate sample paths that show how faults can cascade or escalate between components, and also how each component reacts when other components fail.
A. Electric Power Infrastructure Components
We model two components for the electric power infrastructure: a power distribution substation with the proper automation and overload protection, and also the power SCADA part that monitors and controls the substation. The distribution substation is used for transferring power from the transmission system to the distribution system and also for supplying power to the communication station. The power SCADA system on the other hand, that is located in the power utility's control room, monitors and controls the substation by receiving power measurements and sending commands using communication network.
1) Power Distribution Substation:
The graphical representation of the power distribution substation open hybrid automaton C P 1 is depicted in Fig. 2 . The model has two discrete states that denote the substation operation; q P 1.1 when the substation supplies power to the area, and q P 1.2 when the substation is switched off. The model also has one continuous state, x P 1.1 , that is used as a timer while the model is in the Switch Off state (i.e., q P 1.2 ). The internal input of the model, v P 1.1 , denotes the power that is received from the transmission system. The cyber dependency input, v P 1.1 , denotes the SCADA's discrete switching control signal that is transmitted using the communication infrastructure. The second dependency input, v P 1.2 , is logical and denotes the area's power demand. Finally, the output of the model, y P 1.1 , denotes the amount of power that is supplied from the substation to the area, depending on the model's discrete state.
Starting from the Supply Power state (i.e., q P 1.1 ), the model will remain there as long as the switching control signal is v P 1.1 = 0 and also the power demand is less than the available power, i.e., v P 1.2 < v P 1.2 . As soon as one of the above conditions is violated, the guard of the edge e = (q P 1.1 , q P 1.2 ) will become true and a discrete transition to the Switch Off state (i.e., q P 1.2 ) will take place. This means that a switching event occurred, which was triggered either from the SCADA system (i.e., v becomes true. This will happen when the switching control signal is v 1 = 0, and also the necessary safety time period T safe has passed since the occurrence of the switching event (i.e., x P 1 > T safe ). Once the guard conditions becomes true the continuous state will reset (i.e., x P 1 := 0) and a discrete state transition to the Supply Power state (i.e., q P 1.2 ) will take place. The whole process will then repeat again accordingly.
2) Power SCADA:
The open hybrid automaton model C P 2 that represents the Power SCADA part that monitors and controls the substation is shown in Fig. 3 . There are three discrete states in the model, based on the selected switching activity in the substation; q P 2.1 when the substation switch must be closed, q P 2.2 when the substation switch must be opened, and q P 2.3 when data are not available through the network. These discrete states are determined by the two inputs v 
B. Communication Infrastructure Component
For the communication infrastructure we developed an open hybrid automaton model that represents a communication station with the necessary network links, that enables bidirectional communication between the power substation and the power SCADA system. The communication station, although receives power from the substation, it is also equipped with a backup uninterruptible power supply (UPS) system that will keep it running, for some period of time, in the case of a power outage. 
1) Communication Station and

C. Composition
With the CIs components open hybrid automata models ready, we continue with their composition, that will give us a single hybrid automaton model that represents the two interdependent CIs. The composition hybrid automaton is depicted in Fig. 5 , showing the various input/output connections between the individual components, as well as, the three types of existing dependencies, physical, cyber, and logical.
Since the communication station is physically dependent on the substation for power supply, we have the connection v interdependent CIs behavior. We can used it to study and analyze how faults cascade through the various dependencies and interdependencies, as well as how different infrastructure components behave during faults. In the next section we derive simulation results using the composition model that validate the potential of the proposed approach.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
We implemented the composition hybrid automaton model in Fig. 5 using Matlab's Simulink software, and then simulated it for several scenarios. The results presented in this section are from a single simulation run where the composition model was simulated for a 24 hour period, while faults were introduced to the components at a certain time instances. The simulation results are shown in Fig. 6 , and the sequence of events generated by the faults are listed in Table I . In Fig. 6 , each one of the plots corresponds to a single component, depicting at the top the discrete state evolution, and at the bottom the continuous input or output variable that is the most appropriate for each component.
Over the 24 hour simulation period we introduce three faults, one in each component at a different time instances. We introduce the first fault at 02:35, which is a power overload at the substation. This triggers the opening of the substation switches, cutting the power in the area, and affecting also the communication station that now relies to its UPS system for power. The fault is resolved at 02:45 and all component return to their original healthy state. We then introduce the second fault at 10:20, which is a technical fault to the communication station. This immediately affects the Power SCADA's bidirectional communication with the power substation. We resolved this fault at 11:40, and once again all the components return to their original healthy state. Finally, we introduce the third fault at 18:00, where the SCADA operator commands the opening of the substation switches for maintenance. This fault at the beginning generates the same sequence of events as the first fault, but then since the switches were kept open for too long, the communication station runs out of UPS power and stops. Although the SCADA operator tries at 19:10 to close the switches remotely, is unable to do it due to the lack of communication, thus both systems are unable to return to their original healthy state.
From the simulation results ( Fig. 6 and Table I) we can see that the composition model was able to capture how faults can cascade and/or escalate through (inter)dependencies between different CI components and disrupt their healthy operation. Each one of the introduced faults generates different sequence of events and information on how dependencies and interdependencies can increase the risk of failures and disruptions in different CIs. Using the model, we can run similar simulation scenarios, with the faults occurring at different time instances, searching for weak areas between CIs that can decrease their reliability.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we proposed hybrid systems for modeling interdependent CIs. Specifically, we adopted open hybrid automata to model components of different CIs including their dependencies. Using composition properties, we were able to composed the various CI component models together and create a single hybrid automaton model that can represent interdependent CIs.
We also presented a modeling example where three components of two different infrastructures were modeled and composed together. The simulation results demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed hybrid system approach, generating information on how faults cascade and/or escalate through (inter)dependencies, disrupting the healthy operation of different CI components.
In the future we plan to use hybrid systems to implement more complex CI component models with more sophisticated dynamics, that can provide more realistic representations. We will also exploit hybrid systems reachability analysis to discover the sets of inputs that can push the models to undesirable states.
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Due to cyber dependency, the power SCADA receives data for the outage, and transitions to the Open state (Fig. 6 (b) ). → (1c) 02:35
Due to physical dependency, the communication station is left without power, and transitions to under UPS state (Fig. 6 (c) ) (2a) 02:45
Power SCADA transitions to the Close state, and sends close command to the Substation switches (Fig. 6 (b) ). → (2b) 02:45
Due to cyber dependency, the power substation transitions to the Supply Power state (Fig. 6 (a) ) → (2c) 02:45
Due to physical dependency, the comm. station receives power again, and transitions to the Healthy state (Fig. 6 (b) ). (3a) 10:20 A technical fault is introduced to the communication station (v C 1.1 = 1), thus it transitions to the Fault state (Fig. 6 (c) ). →(3b) 10:20 Due to logical dependency, the substation power supply drops since comm. station no longer consumes power ( Fig. 6 (a) ). →(3c) 10:20 Due to cyber dependency, the power SCADA loses connection with network, and transitions to the No Data state (Fig. 6 (b) ). (4a) 11:40
The technical fault to the communication station resolves (v C 1.1 = 0), and transitions to the Healthy state (Fig. 6 (c) ). →(4b) 11:40 Due to logical dependency, the substation power supply increases since comm. station receives power again ( Fig. 6 (a) ). →(4c) 11:40 Due to cyber dependency, the power SCADA receives data again and transitions to the Close state ( Fig. 6 (b) . (5a) 18:00
The power SCADA transitions to the Open state, since the operator commands the substation switches to open ( Fig. 6 (b) ). →(5b) 18:00
Due to cyber dependency, the command is received by the substation and transitions to the Switch Off state ( Fig. 6 (a) ). →(5c) 18:00
Due to physical dependency, the comm. station is left without power and transitions to the under UPS state (Fig. 6 (c) ).
→(5d) 19:00
The UPS support period ends, and the communication station stops operating and transitions to the Fault state (Fig. 6 (c) ).
→(5e) 19:00
Due to cyber dependency, the power SCADA loses connection with network and transitions to the No Data state (Fig. 6 (b) ). (6a) 19: 10 Although the power SCADA operator tries to send command to the substation switches to close (i.e., v P 2.1 = 0), since there is no communication the switch cannot close remotely.
